Abstract-Physical layer security encompasses information the oretic approaches that could guarantee perfect secrecy in wireless communication systems. In this framework, helping interferer strategies rely on intentionally creating confusion at a potential eavesdropper by injecting a jamming signal. In cases where the information signal has a Gaussian probability density function (pdf) it has been demonstrated that the optimal jamming signal, under an overall power constraint, should also be Gaussian.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security in the exchange of information has commonly been treated as an inherently applied subject, despite the theoretical formulation of perfect secrecy early on [1] . Notwithstanding decades of research, the gap between applied cryptography and information theoretic security has not yet been bridged.
Shannon described encryption as a set of reversible trans formations, such that the mutual information between the message and the enciphered text should be null. However, despite its conceptual beauty, the concept of perfect secrecy was abandoned as it proved difficult to develop practical codes along this line. On the contrary, cryptography mainly evolved as a part of computer science and relied on complexity, rather than information and communication theory. Commonly, such encryption protocols underpin the security of mobile telecom munications as well as e-business, e-commerce, e-government, banking networks, and are employed at upper layers of the network protocol stack.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned approaches share a com mon weakness; they assume ideal transmission and reception and do not account for the adverse characteristics of the communication medium. Specifically for wireless applications, there exists an experimentally established fundamental trade off between security and throughput [2] , [3] . In order to address this important issue in future wireless applications, information theoretic physical layer approaches on security have been gaining renewed interest. The breakthrough concept of physical layer security [4] is to exploit the characteristics of the wireless medium such as fading or noise to achieve secrecy in wireless transmissions.
The pioneering works of Wyner [4] and Csiszar and Korner [5] have demonstrated that a noisy communication channel offers opportunities for non-zero rate secure communication when the eavesdropper's channel is on average a degraded version of the main channel. Ensuring secrecy through equiv ocation, a single letter characterization of the secrecy capacity was obtained for Gaussian signals, as the difference between the capacities of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper [6] . Furthermore, analyses for the wireless fading channel [7] and Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems [8] have established positive secrecy capacities for such systems even when on average the eavesdropper's channel can be better than that of the legitimate user.
In these approaches, the transmitter needs to know the Channel Impulse Response (CIR) at least between the trans mitter and the legitimate receiver so that it can adapt the transmission rate accordingly, thus achieving a positive secrecy capacity. However, from a communication system point of view, the highly variable transmission rate might not be suitable for a number of applications, while the need for a feedback channel to provide the transmitter with the CIR is also disadvantageous. In view of this, helping-interferer approaches [9] , [10], [11] have been proposed, building on the idea of intentionally degrading the eavesdropper's channel. In this paper, we investigate the optimal design of the jamming signal in a helping interferer physical layer security approach.
In previous analyses, simplified secrecy capacity expres sions were obtained assuming that the data have a Gaussian probability density function (pdf). On the contrary, in this investigation an analysis is presented for actual communi cation systems in which the data are drawn from multi leveUmultiphase discrete uniform probability mass functions while Section VI concludes the present work.
II. MOTIVATION: CASE STUDY OF BPSK SYSTEMS
To illustrate the motivation behind this work, we begin by assuming a cOlmnunication system in which length N observation vectors Zr are obtained at the outputs of matched filters at the legitimate (r = l) and eavesdropping receivers (r = e):
(1)
To allow for a compact notation, the generic index r E {I, e} corresponds to the legitimate receiver for r = I and to the eavesdropper for r = e. 
In ( 
where i denotes the projection of the helping interferer i( t) on the signal space, "'l = 0 and without loss of generality we have assumed that all variables involved are normalized to the data standard deviation, so that i has unit variance. In a hypothetical noiseless scenario with "'e = 1 and a;;',e = 0, we exatnine the following two distinct approaches: (i) The jatmning signal has a Gaussian pdf; in this approach the Bit Error-Rate (BER) is evaluated at 0.1624. 
The nominal lllllllmum distance is dmi n = 2. There is a substantial decrease in the lattice effective minimum distance as depicted in Fig. 1 . In effect, instead of increasing the denominator of the arguments of the complementary error functions, we are decreasing the numerators, in a sense de creasing the eavesdropper Gram matrices eigenvalues in (4).
III. SECRECY CAPACITY OF M-QAM AND M-PSK

SYSTEMS
We revisit the model described in (5) and (6) in absence of a jamming signal, i.e. K,r = 0, r E {Z, e }. Furthermore, the data symbol d is drawn from a discrete uniform pmf of M -QAM or M -PSK constellations from the set ::D = {dl, ... , d M }. The system capacity Cr(M) at the legitimate user (r = l) and the eavesdropper (r = e) can then be expressed as a function of the constellation size M as
where D K L ( ' , . ) denotes the Kullback -Leibler divergence and
is the normalized to the noise standard deviation distance between any two constellation points [16] , [17] .
A useful closed-form approximation of (9) was proposed in [17] so that in AW GN channel we have that -� t, log (� t, e -I��=12 )
1=1 e where in (11) we denote
, r E {Z, e } 
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY OF M-QAM AND M-PSK
SYSTEMS WITH A HELPING INTERFERER (13)
Now we revisit the model described in (5) and (6) in the presence of a jamming signal with an unknown pdf PI( i) .
Due to the independence of the random variables involved, the capacity of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper respectively can in this case be expressed as
where Q9 denotes convolution.
(14)
In order to simplify calculations, in the following we assume that PI(i) can be approximated by a mixture of L complex 
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An approximation for the secrecy capacity can be obtained by noticing that the second sum in (25) is negligible compared to the first sum, so that
The optimal jamming signal maXllll izes (26) subject to an overall power constraint at the legitimate receiver,
The maximization of (26) s.t. (27) is an integer mutlivariate and multiparametric optimization problem. In the following we present simulation results in aSYlllinetric interferer scenarios, evaluating the respective secrecy capacities in the case of Gaussian and M -QAM jamming signals.
V. ASYMMETRIC INTERFERER, NON-DEGRADED EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
In this scenario the injection of the noise is performed by (20) a helping node in the vicinity of the eavesdropper, located sufficiently far from the legitimate receiver so that are the normalized to the combined standard deviation dis tances between the constellation points and the mean values of the Gaussian components.
After some algebraic manipulations, we conclude that
Denoting the set Q as the product of the sets M = {I, ... , M} and 1: = {l, ... , L} and setting we may approximate the capacity in the main and eavesdrop-
Furthermore, we assume that the legitimate user and the eavesdropper experience similar degradation due to white noise, i.e.
so that the SNR in the main and the eavesdropper's channel is equal to ')'0. We will examine two distinct strategies. According to the first strategy, the interferer is a zero-mean Gaussian signal while according to the second it is a discrete multi level/multiphase signal (M-QAM or M-PSK), mimicking the statistical properties of the data. In the Gaussian interferer strategy, denoted as the GI ap proach in the following, we have 
16-QAM
GI ' The second strategy, denoted as V niform Interferer (UI) ap proach in the following, is summarized as
The capacities GCI and Gu I in the GI and UI strategies respectively are evaluated in Figs 2, 3 and 4 for 4-QAM, 16-QAM and 64-QAM systems. The achievable rates in the GI and UI strategies follow distinctly different trends. Increasing the SNR increases the achievable rate in the case of the GI strategy, On the other hand, the effect is more complex in the UI strategy and further depends on the SIR. Based on the above results, we expect that depending on the SNR and the SIR either the GI or the UI approach may be advantageous in terms of achievable secrecy rates, The difference in secrecy rates can be quantified in bits/symbollHz as (
In Figs 5, 6 and 7 6.R s is depicted for 4-QAM, 16-QAM and 64-QAM systems. In the high SNR and high SIR region an advantage of more than log2 M -1 bits/symbollHz in the achievable secrecy rate can be established when the VI strategy is used,
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Vnlike previous helping interferer approaches in the frame work of physical layer security, the present work does not assume Gaussianity of the interferer as the optimal jamming strategy. On the contrary, we have shown through a counterex ample that for practical communication systems that employ M-QAM or M-PSK modulations this is a sub-optimal choice. We have derived a closed-form approximate expression for the secrecy capacity in such systems by approximating an arbitrary helping interferer pdf as a mixture of Gaussian components. Through simulation, we have demonstrated that in the high SNR and high SIR region there is a clear gain in terms of secrecy rates in asymmetric helping interferer scenarios when the jamming signal shares the statistical properties of the data rather than the noise. Future work will quantify 
